I develop and quantify a novel theory of GATT/WTO negotiations. This theory provides new answers to two prominent questions in the trade policy literature. First, what do GATT/WTO negotiators negotiate about? And second, what is the role played by the fundamental GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination? My main result is that in 'new trade'environments, GATT/WTO negotiations governed by the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination no longer necessarily have to be interpreted as helping countries overcome a terms-of-trade externality but can instead also be viewed as helping countries internalize a production relocation externality.
Introduction
International trade has been liberalized dramatically since the end of World War II. According to WTO estimates, the average ad valorem tari¤ on manufacturing goods has been reduced from over 40 percent to below 4 percent during this time period.
This dramatic liberalization was largely the result of a sequence of successful rounds of trade negotiations governed by the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) and its successor the World Trade Organization (WTO). 1 The GATT/WTO is an institution regulating trade negotiations through a set of prenegotiated articles. The principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination are usually considered to be the essence of these articles. Generally speaking, the former advises that tari¤ changes keep changes in imports equal across trading partners and the latter requires that the same tari¤ must be applied against all trading partners for any given traded product. 2 In this paper, I develop and quantify a novel theory of GATT/WTO negotiations. This My benchmark is, of course, the standard neoclassical theory of GATT/WTO negotiations. Its main idea goes back to Johnson (1953-54) and builds on the classic optimal tari¤ argument: 3 in a neoclassical environment, each country has an incentive to impose import tari¤s in order to improve its terms-of-trade. However, if all countries impose import tari¤s in an attempt to improve their terms-of-trade, no country actually succeeds and ine¢ ciently high 1 According to WTO statistics, industrial countries have cut their tari¤s on industrial products by an average 36 percent during the …rst …ve GATT rounds , an average 37 percent in the Kennedy Round , an average 33 percent in the Tokyo Round , and an average 38 percent in the Uruguay Round (1986-94). There is some controversy about the scope of GATT/WTO negotiations. Rose (2004) …nds that GATT/WTO members did not bene…t more from GATT/WTO negotiations than non-members. However, Subramanian and Wei (2007) , and Tomsz et al. (2007) argue that this …nding is not robust. 2 I adopt here Bagwell and Staiger's (1999) interpretation of the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination which I will discuss in more detail later on. 3 The classic optimal tari¤ argument itself is actually much older than Johnson (1953-54) . See Irwin (1996) for a history of thought. tari¤s prevail. This ine¢ ciency then creates incentives for cooperative trade policy setting.
Essentially, tari¤s entail an international terms-of-trade externality and trade negotiations serve to internalize this externality. 4 Grossman and Helpman (1995) extended this main argument to the case in which governments are subject to pressure from domestic interest groups. They demonstrated that tari¤s continue to entail a terms-of-trade externality in this case which can be internalized in trade negotiations. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) built on this literature and developed a uni…ed framework of GATT/WTO negotiations. In a very general neoclassical trade model in which governments have preferences consistent with all leading political economy approaches, they showed that the fundamental GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination can be interpreted as simple negotiation rules which help governments internalize the terms-of-trade externality. They also demonstrated that the terms-of-trade externality is the only trade policy externality which can arise in this environment thus making it the only trade policy externality GATT/WTO negotiations can be about. 5 Instead of analyzing GATT/WTO negotiations in a neoclassical trade model, my 'new trade'theory builds on a Krugman (1980) 'new trade'model. 6 My main result is that in this 'new trade'environment, GATT/WTO negotiations governed by the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination no longer necessarily have to be interpreted as helping countries over- 4 See also Kuga (1973) , Mayer (1981) , Riezman (1982) , Dixit (1987) , Kennan and Riezman (1988) , Maggi (1999) , and Syropoulos (2002) for other important contributions to that literature. 5 An alternative theory of trade agreements was o¤ered by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998). It stresses commitment considerations, pointing out that trade agreements may help governments commit vis-à-vis domestic special interest groups. It di¤ers fundamentally both from the standard terms-of-trade theory of GATT/WTO negotiations as well as from my 'new trade' theory of GATT/WTO negotiations in that it does not view trade negotiations as a means to internalize an international trade policy externality. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) show how this commitment theory can be combined with the standard terms-of-trade theory. See also Staiger and Tabellini (1987) and Mitra (2002) . 6 While the argument can be made most cleanly in the context of the simple Krugman (1980) model, it generalizes to more complicated environments. For example, all results can also be derived in a variant of the Arkolakis et al (2008) version of Melitz (2003) , as I discuss in detail in a separate appendix which is available upon request. This is not surprising since the e¤ect I emphasize is closely related to the home market e¤ect. The home market e¤ect is generally considered to be a fundamental feature of environments with increasing returns to scale and transport costs (see, for example, Helpman and Krugman 1985: 209) . It is also the basis of the 'new economic geography'literature initiated by Krugman (1991) and synthesized by Fujita et al. (1999) . See Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (1998), Davis and Weinstein (1999, 2003) , Head and Ries (2001) , and Hanson and Xiang (2004) for evidence on the home market e¤ect.
come a terms-of-trade externality but can instead also be interpreted as helping countries internalize a production relocation externality. In my model, a production relocation externality arises in the sense that countries can use trade policy to gain at the expense of other countries by attracting a larger share of manufacturing production. In particular, a unilateral increase in import tari¤s makes foreign manufacturing goods more expensive in the domestic market so that domestic consumers shift expenditure towards domestic manufacturing goods. As a consequence, domestic manufacturing …rms sell more thus making pro…ts and foreign manufacturing …rms sell less thus making losses which triggers entry into the domestic manufacturing sector and exit out of foreign manufacturing sectors. This relocation of manufacturing production increases domestic welfare but reduces foreign welfare since it reduces the share of manufacturing goods consumed by domestic consumers which is subject to trade costs but increases the share of manufacturing goods consumed by foreign consumers which is subject to trade costs. The GATT/WTO principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination help governments internalize this externality since they jointly ensure that tari¤ changes no longer entail production relocations. This is because, under these principles, tari¤-induced changes in domestic consumer expenditure towards or away from domestic manufacturing goods are exactly o¤set by changes in foreign consumer expenditure away from or towards these goods.
By neutralizing the production relocation externality, the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination not only guide countries away from the ine¢ cient noncooperative equilibrium in a way which monotonically increases welfare in all countries, but they also secure negotiated tari¤ concessions by eliminating all incentives to reverse them. This is important since many economists have questioned the practical relevance of termsof-trade considerations for actual trade negotiations. Krugman (1997: 113) , for example, …nds the optimal tari¤ argument so irrelevant to real-world disputes over trade policy that he even concludes one cannot make economic sense of GATT/WTO negotiations at all. However, I do not aim to disprove the importance of terms-of-trade e¤ects. 7 Instead, I hope to strengthen 7 In fact, recent studies by Broda, Limao, and Weinstein (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming) suggest that terms-of-trade considerations do play a role in governments'tari¤ choices. the literature's most fundamental claim that economic logic can be used to make sense of GATT/WTO negotiations by providing an alternative economic explanation of GATT/WTO negotiations. One advantage of this explanation is that it can be linked directly to trade policy debates. While trade policymakers are assumed to maximize domestic welfare in the model, their tari¤ choices are exactly as if they maximized the number of domestic manufacturing …rms. And since the number of domestic manufacturing …rms translates directly into the number of domestic manufacturing jobs, this is equivalent to maximizing the number of domestic manufacturing jobs.
Given the gravity structure of my model, I can quantify it using an extension of the technique developed by Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007) . An attractive feature of this technique is that it relies directly on bilateral trade data and only requires few parameter estimates. Focusing on the six major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations, I show that my stylized production relocation model generates Nash tari¤s of the same order of magnitude than the actual tari¤s observed during the tari¤ war following the Smoot-Hawley Tari¤ Act of 1930. 8 I also show that my model predicts the welfare losses from reverting to Nash tari¤s to be moderate never exceeding 1.2 percent for any country in any speci…cation.
While I am, I believe, the …rst to study trade negotiations in a 'new trade'model, I am by no means the …rst to study trade policy in such a model. It is well-known that, in Krugman (1980) type environments, import tari¤s generally have production relocation and terms-oftrade e¤ects. Venables (1987) was the …rst to develop a version of the Krugman (1980) model which isolates production relocation e¤ects. Gros (1987) was the …rst to develop a version of the Krugman (1980) model which isolates terms-of-trade e¤ects. 9;10;11 Essentially, the positive pro…ts made by manufacturing …rms as a result of import tari¤s can be competed away either through entry leading to a production relocation e¤ect or through an increase in wages leading to a terms-of-trade e¤ect. The relative strength of these two e¤ects is determined by the elasticity of the labor supply curve facing the manufacturing sector as a whole. Models with freely traded homogeneous non-manufacturing goods generate a perfectly elastic labor supply curve and therefore isolate production relocation e¤ects. Models without non-manufacturing goods at all generate a perfectly inelastic labor supply curve and therefore isolate terms-oftrade e¤ects. Intermediate cases can be constructed with freely or costly traded di¤erentiated non-manufacturing goods.
In order to emphasize the novel features of my 'new trade' theory of GATT/WTO negotiations, I isolate production relocation e¤ects throughout. In the next section, I lay out the basic model and explain how GATT/WTO negotiations governed by the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination can be interpreted as helping governments internalize a production relocation externality. I keep this analysis deliberately simple with the purpose of clearly conveying my qualitative point. In the third section, I then calibrate a more realistic version of the basic model and demonstrate that it generates Nash tari¤s of the same order of magnitude than the actual tari¤s observed during the tari¤ war following the Smoot-Hawley Tari¤ Act of 1930. 9 The classic optimal tari¤ argument therefore also applies in 'new trade' environments. An extra twist is that a tari¤ can now also be used to correct the domestic distortion originating from the monopoly pricing of domestic manufacturing …rms. Gros (1987) shows that therefore the optimal tari¤ is positive even if the country is so small that it has no market power in world markets. See also Flam and Helpman (1987) and Helpman and Krugman (1989 Martin and Rogers (1995) . They show that symmetric liberalization between asymmetric countries leads to international …rm relocations from the small to the large country. They also show that the large country needs to liberalize faster than the small country if international …rm relocations are to be prevented. See also Baldwin et al. (2003) .
Basic model
In this section, I lay out the basic model and explain how GATT/WTO negotiations governed by the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination can be interpreted as helping governments internalize a production relocation externality. I …rst focus on a two-country case to highlight the role played by the principle of reciprocity. I then move to a three-country extension to shed light on the role played by the principle of nondiscrimination.
2.1 Two-country case: GATT/WTO and reciprocity
Setup
There are two countries: country 1 and country 2. Consumers have access to a continuum of di¤erentiated manufacturing goods and a single homogeneous non-manufacturing good.
Preferences over these goods are identical in both countries. They are given by the following utility functions
where m ij is the quantity of a manufacturing good from country i consumed in country j, Y j is the quantity of the non-manufacturing good consumed in country j, n i is the 'number'of manufacturing goods produced in country i, > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between manufacturing goods, and is the share of income spent on manufacturing goods. Technologies are also identical in both countries. They are summarized by the following (inverse) production functions
where l M j is the labor requirement for producing q M j units of a manufacturing good in country j, l Y j is the labor requirement for producing q Y j units of the non-manufacturing good in country j, f denotes the …xed labor requirement of manufacturing production, and c denotes the marginal labor requirement of manufacturing production. The manufacturing goods market is monopolistically competitive whereas the non-manufacturing good market is perfectly competitive.
Tari¤s are introduced as a component of 'iceberg'trade costs which apply only to manufacturing goods. 12 For one unit of a manufacturing good from country i to arrive in country j, (1 + t ij ) units must be shipped and the remainder 'melts away'in transit, where > 1 is a transport cost and t ij 0 is the tari¤ imposed by country j against imports from country i. 13 To economize notation, I make frequent use of the shorthand ij 1 + t ij throughout. Notice that, modeled this way, tari¤s do not generate any revenue. This is essential for the model's It occurred before the use of export policy instruments was constrained by GATT/WTO regulations suggesting that there are reasons why governments typically refrain from using them. 14 I do not explore these reasons in this paper but simply assume that import tari¤s are I also make the following three additional assumptions: …rst, I restrict t ij to be …nite so that t t ij 0 overall, where t is an arbitrarily large but …nite upper bound. This upper bound is purely introduced for technical convenience. Removing it would somewhat complicate the exposition without changing the results in any interesting way (see the appendix for a detailed discussion of the consequences of letting t ! 1). Second, I assume that the manufacturing sector is always active in both countries. This requires transport costs to be su¢ ciently large (see the appendix for the precise restriction on ). It ensures that countries can never attract all manufacturing …rms through trade policy and thereby eliminates uninteresting corner solutions. Finally, I assume that the non-manufacturing good sector is always active in both countries. This requires the demand for manufacturing goods to be su¢ ciently small (see the appendix for the precise parameter restriction on ). It ensures, together with the assumptions made on market structure, non-manufacturing good technology, preferences, and trade costs that there is no role for terms-of-trade e¤ects in this environment. I comment further on this latter point below.
Solution for given trade policy
I choose the price of the non-manufacturing good as the numeraire which implies that wages are equal to one in both countries since the non-manufacturing good sector is always active in both countries, the non-manufacturing good market is perfectly competitive, the nonmanufacturing good is produced using the above technology, and is freely traded among countries. For given tari¤s, the model's solution is then determined by the market clearing conditions for manufacturing …rms in country 1 and country 2
where q
are the break-even outputs determined by free entry, p c 1 are the ex-factory prices determined by pro…t maximization,
are the ideal manufacturing price indices, and L 1 and L 2 are the numbers of consumers or workers. Equations (4) and (5) can be solved immediately for the equilibrium manufacturing price indices
If the de…nitions of the manufacturing price indices are substituted, they can also be solved for the equilibrium numbers of manufacturing …rms
Notice that this equilibrium has three special features. First, the world number of manufacturing …rms is constant since
. Second, tari¤s a¤ect welfare only through the manufacturing price indices since indirect utilities are given by
Finally, there can be no role for terms-of-trade e¤ects since ex-factory prices are independent of trade policy. 15 These features all help to clarify the argument but are not crucial for the main results.
Production relocation e¤ect and import price e¤ect
Equations (6) and (7) reveal that each country's price index is monotonically decreasing in its own tari¤ regardless of the other country's tari¤ but monotonically increasing in the other country's tari¤ regardless of the own tari¤ so that each country can always use trade policy to gain at the other country's expense. This trade policy externality is brought about by a production relocation e¤ect. In particular, a unilateral increase in import tari¤s makes foreign manufacturing goods more expensive in the domestic market so that domestic consumers shift expenditure towards domestic manufacturing goods. As a consequence, domestic manufacturing …rms sell more thus making pro…ts and foreign manufacturing …rms sell less thus making losses which triggers entry into the domestic manufacturing sector and exit out of the foreign manufacturing sector, as is also re ‡ected in equations (8) and (9). This reduces the domestic price index but increases the foreign price index since it reduces the share of manufacturing goods consumed by domestic consumers which is subject to trade costs but increases the share of manufacturing goods consumed by foreign consumers which is subject to trade costs. 16;17 While this production relocation e¤ect is the only channel through which domestic tari¤s a¤ect foreign welfare, domestic welfare is also a¤ected by a counteracting but dominated import price e¤ect. In particular, domestic import tari¤s also directly increase the domestic price index by making still-imported manufacturing goods more expensive. The reason why the production relocation e¤ect always dominates the import price e¤ect can be best understood with the help of equations (4) and (5). A unilateral increase in import tari¤s initially increases the domestic price index because of the import price e¤ect which increases sales and pro…ts of domestic …rms. To restore equilibrium, there has to be entry into the domestic manufacturing sector and exit out of the foreign manufacturing sector which reduces the domestic price index and increases the foreign price index. This makes it harder for domestic …rms to sell goods in the domestic market but easier for domestic …rms to sell goods in the foreign market so that the domestic post-tari¤ equilibrium price index must be below its pre-tari¤ level. If it merely returned to its pre-tari¤ level, domestic …rms could still export more than before and would therefore make positive pro…ts.
Noncooperative trade policy
I now consider what happens if governments choose trade policy noncooperatively in an attempt to maximize their citizens'welfare. While welfare maximization is …rst and foremost a simplifying assumption, it is actually more realistic than one might think. Maggi and Goldberg (1999), for example, …nd that the weight of welfare in the government's objective function is many times larger than the weight of trade-policy-in ‡uencing campaign contributions.
Notice …rst that the noncooperative equilibrium is maximum protection. This follows 1 6 Notice that the production relocation e¤ect depends crucially on increasing returns to scale. Essentially, it is a tari¤-induced change in the pattern of specialization brought about by changes in relative market size which cannot arise in neoclassical environments. 1 7 Notice that the production relocation gain could still not be interpreted as a terms-of-trade gain even if a price-index-based de…nition of the terms-of-trade was adopted. This is because country j's terms-of-trade would then have to be de…ned as
immediately from the fact that each country's price index is monotonically decreasing in its own tari¤ regardless of the other country's tari¤ and is stated more formally in lemma 1: 18 Lemma 1 Suppose that governments choose tari¤ s simultaneously in an attempt to maximize their citizens' welfare. Then the unique Nash equilibrium is (t 21 ; t 12 ) = t; t .
Proof. Follows immediately from equations (6) and (7).
Observe second that a tari¤ combination is e¢ cient if and only if the tari¤ is zero in at least one of the countries. Intuitively, there always exists a bilateral tari¤ reduction which reduces one country's price index without a¤ecting the other country's price index by appropriately balancing the import price e¤ect and the production relocation e¤ect. However, bilateral tari¤ reductions are only possible if tari¤s are positive in both countries so that Pareto improvements cannot be achieved if the tari¤ is zero in at least one of the countries: 19 Lemma 2 The set of Pareto-e¢ cient tari¤ combinations consists of all (t 21 ; t 12 ) such that (t 21 ; t 12 ) = (any t 21 ; 0) or (t 21 ; t 12 ) = (0; any t 12 ) :
Proof. See the appendix for a formal proof.
Thus, the noncooperative equilibrium is ine¢ cient. While the details of lemma 1 and 2 clearly re ‡ect speci…c modeling assumptions, this result captures a …rst fundamental point: tari¤s entail a production relocation externality which governments fail to internalize when setting tari¤s noncooperatively. It is therefore stated as proposition 1:
The noncooperative equilibrium is ine¢ cient.
Proof. Follows immediately from lemmas 1 and 2.
Trade policy under the GATT/WTO: the principle of reciprocity
I now contrast this with the outcome achieved under the GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity as interpreted by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) . 20 Generally speaking, the principle of reciprocity advises that tari¤ changes keep changes in imports equal across trading partners.
However, this principle has two particular applications in GATT/WTO practice and is not binding to the same degree in both these applications. First, governments are to seek a 'balance of concessions' during rounds of trade liberalization in the sense that they cut tari¤s reciprocally. While this application is considered to be an important negotiation norm in practice it is actually not encoded in GATT/WTO articles and is therefore not binding in a legal sense. Second, governments are entitled to 'withdraw substantially equivalent concessions'if a trading partner increases previously bound tari¤s in the sense that they retaliate reciprocally. This right is encoded in GATT/WTO articles and therefore has legal status. In light of this discussion, I adopt the following formal de…nition of reciprocity: 21 De…nition 1 De…ne a tari¤ change to be reciprocal if it is such that dT B M 1 = dT B M 2 = 0,
refers to the value of country j's manufacturing exports (imports).
Notice …rst that the principle of reciprocity completely eliminates all trade policy externalities. Given aggregate manufacturing market clearing, the number of manufacturing …rms operating in country j can be decomposed as follows:
The numerator is just the total expenditure on country j's manufacturing goods by country i's and country j's consumers, since this can be decomposed into the total expenditure on 2 0 Of course, the principle of nondiscrimination is trivially satis…ed in a two-country world. 2 1 While I follow Bagwell and Staiger's (1999) interpretation of the principle of reciprocity, I adapt their formal de…nition to my speci…c setting by applying it only to manufacturing trade. This makes it distinct from the de…nition used by in the comparable 'outside good'setting since they continue to include non-manufacturing trade. country i's and country j's manufacturing goods by country j's consumers ( L j ), plus the total expenditure on country j's manufacturing goods by country i's consumers (EXP M j ), minus the total expenditure on country i's manufacturing goods by country j's consumers (IM P M j ).
The denominator is just the (constant) sales of country j's manufacturing …rms. Hence, if
T B M j is …xed by reciprocity, country j's number of manufacturing …rms is …xed as well.
Intuitively, tari¤-induced changes in country j's consumer expenditure towards or away from country j's manufacturing goods are then exactly o¤set by tari¤-induced changes in country i's consumer expenditure away from or towards these goods. This result is summarized as lemma 3: 22
Lemma 3 Tari¤ changes leave the number of …rms unchanged in both countries if and only if they are reciprocal.
Proof. Follows immediately from equation (10) and the de…nition of reciprocity.
Observe second that reciprocal tari¤ concessions increase welfare monotonically in both countries. Recall that a country's price index is a¤ected by its own tari¤ through two opposing e¤ects: the production relocation e¤ect which tends to make a country's price index decreasing in its own tari¤; and the import price e¤ect which tends to make a country's price index increasing in its own tari¤. As was discussed above, the production relocation e¤ect dominates the import price e¤ect so that a country's price index is decreasing in its own tari¤. However, if the production relocation e¤ect is eliminated by reciprocity, only the import price e¤ect remains so that a country's price index then becomes increasing in its own tari¤.
While the details of lemma 3 again re ‡ect speci…c modeling assumptions, this result captures a second fundamental point: the principle of reciprocity makes countries internalize the production relocation externality by ruling out changes in the manufacturing trade balance which 2 2 Of course, reciprocal tari¤ changes only leave the number of …rms unchanged in both countries if the world number of manufacturing …rms is independent of trade policy. This is the case in this environment but depends on functional form assumptions. More generally, the principle of reciprocity prevents countries from gaining at the expense of one another by ruling out changes in the manufacturing trade balance which shift expenditure away from one country's manufacturing sector towards the other country's manufacturing sector.
shift expenditure away from one country's manufacturing sector towards the other country's manufacturing sector. It is therefore stated as proposition 2:
Proposition 2 Reciprocal trade liberalization (trade protection) monotonically increases (decreases) welfare in both countries.
Proof. Follows immediately from lemma 3 and the de…nitions of manufacturing price indices.
Notice …nally that the principle of reciprocity therefore not only guides countries away from the ine¢ cient noncooperative equilibrium in a way which monotonically increases welfare in all countries but also secures negotiated tari¤ concessions by eliminating all incentives to reverse them. Suppose that, starting at the noncooperative equilibrium, country j assumes the leadership in trade negotiations. Then, since country i is to respond reciprocally to any tari¤ reduction by country j, i.e. since country i is to seek a 'balance of concessions', country j immediately has an incentive to initiate reciprocal trade liberalization which monotonically increases welfare in both countries. Also, since country i is entitled to respond reciprocally to any tari¤ increase by country j, i.e. since country i is entitled to 'withdraw substantially equivalent concessions', country j never has an incentive to increase its tari¤ so that negotiated tari¤ concessions can be secured. 23 In summary, the principle of reciprocity can thus be seen as helping governments escape the ine¢ cient noncooperative equilibrium in a way which monotonically increases welfare in all countries. 24 
Three-country case: GATT/WTO and nondiscrimination
While the basic two-country model is thus useful to illustrate the role played by the GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity, it is too simple to shed light on the role played by the GATT/WTO principle of nondiscrimination. For this reason, I now consider an extension of this model. In particular, I focus on the simplest possible setup that allows for discriminatory tari¤ setting.
There are now three countries: country 1, country 2, and country 3. Country 1 trades with both country 2 and country 3, but country 2 and country 3 trade with country 1 only so that only country 1 can set discriminatory tari¤s. Everything else is just as in the basic model.
All results regarding noncooperative trade policy naturally generalize to the three-country case. Most importantly, the noncooperative equilibrium is still ine¢ cient because tari¤s entail a production relocation externality which governments fail to internalize when setting tari¤s noncooperatively. Readers interested in the details of the noncooperative equilibrium can …nd the solution of the three-country model together with the three-country versions of lemma 1, lemma 2, and proposition 1 in the appendix.
However, this similarity conceals that tari¤s now have more complicated international implications. Besides the import price e¤ect, there is now both a bilateral as well as a multilateral production relocation e¤ect. The bilateral production relocation e¤ect is an e¤ect between the two countries directly a¤ected by the tari¤ and is just the production relocation e¤ect familiar from the two-country model: for example, a tari¤ imposed by country 1 against country 2 leads to production relocations from country 2 to country 1 since this increases the sales and pro…ts of manufacturing …rms in country 1 and reduces the sales and pro…ts of manufacturing …rms in country 2. The multilateral production relocation e¤ect is an additional e¤ect on the third country which is not directly a¤ected by the tari¤. This multilateral production relocation e¤ect works through changes in country 1's manufacturing price index: for example, since a tari¤ imposed by country 1 against country 2 leads to production relocations from country 2 towards country 1, country 1's manufacturing price index falls. If country 1's manufacturing price index falls, country 1's market becomes more competitive which makes it harder for …rms in country 3 to sell their products to country 1.
If it becomes harder for …rms in country 3 to sell their products to country 1, the number of …rms operating in country 3 has to fall in equilibrium so that a tari¤ imposed by country 1 against country 2 does not only lead to production relocations from country 2 to country 1 but also from country 3 to country 1.
The presence of this multilateral production relocation e¤ect implies that the properties of the principle of reciprocity only all generalize to the three-country case if countries engage in multilateral trade negotiations. In particular, the principle of reciprocity now only completely eliminates all trade policy externalities if it is applied in multilateral trade negotiations. Also, the principle of reciprocity now only ensures that negotiated tari¤ concessions increase welfare monotonically in all countries if it is applied in multilateral trade negotiations. Adapting the earlier de…nition of reciprocity to the three country case, tari¤ changes are now to be bilat- 
Given aggregate manufacturing market clearing, the number of manufacturing …rms operating in country j can again be decomposed as follows:
Hence, if country 1 and country 2 change tari¤s in a bilaterally reciprocal way, the number of …rms in country 2 remains unchanged. Therefore, the principle of reciprocity completely elim-inates the bilateral production relocation e¤ect if it is applied in bilateral trade negotiations.
Also, if all countries change tari¤s in a multilaterally reciprocal way, the number of …rms remains unchanged in all countries. Therefore, the principle of reciprocity completely eliminates both the bilateral as well as the multilateral production relocation e¤ect if it is applied in multilateral trade negotiations. Although not obvious from equation (11), the principle of reciprocity is not su¢ cient to also eliminate the multilateral production relocation e¤ect if it is applied in bilateral trade negotiations. This is because bilaterally reciprocal tari¤ changes between country 1 and country 2 change country 1's price index thereby a¤ecting the sales of …rms in country 3. In particular, if country 1 and country 2 liberalize in a bilaterally reciprocal way, country 1's price index falls which makes it harder for …rms in country 3 to export their goods to country 1. As a consequence, …rms in country 3 make losses unless some production relocates to country 1. This is summarized in lemma 6: Proof. See the appendix for a formal proof.
Moreover, if country 1 and country 2 liberalize in a bilaterally reciprocal way, only the bilateral production relocation e¤ect is neutralized so that country 2 gains because of the import price e¤ect, country 1 gains because of the import price e¤ect and the multilateral production relocation e¤ect, but country 3 loses because of the multilateral production relocation e¤ect. If, instead, country 1, country 2, and country 3 liberalize in a multilaterally reciprocal way, the multilateral production relocation e¤ect is also neutralized so that all countries gain because of the import price e¤ect. This is summarized in proposition 4: Proof. See appendix A2 for a formal proof.
Hence, the principle of reciprocity alone is now only su¢ cient to help countries overcome the ine¢ cient noncooperative equilibrium in a way which monotonically increases welfare in all countries if it is applied in multilateral trade negotiations. This suggests that an important role played by the principle of nondiscrimination simply is to multilateralize trade negotiations. 25;26 Under the principle of nondiscrimination, country 1 has to impose the same tari¤ against country 2 and country 3 so that country 1 cannot change its tari¤ against country 2 or country 3 only. As a consequence, country 2 and country 3 are then both authorized to respond to any tari¤ change by country 1 in a way which keeps their manufacturing trade balances unchanged so that multilateral reciprocity prevails. This simple interpretation actually squares well with the justi…cation given by US Secretary of State Cordell Hull for making the principle of nondiscrimination a cornerstone of the US Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act 2 5 Notice that countries do not necessarily have an incentive to engage in multilateral trade negotiations. For example, it is easy to show that country 1 would always prefer sequential bilateral trade negotiations to simultaneous multilateral trade negotiations in the special case of symmetric countries. This is because country 1 gains only because of the import price e¤ect in simultaneous multilateral trade negotiations but also because of the multilateral production relocation e¤ect in sequential bilateral trade negotiations. 2 6 GATT/WTO articles allow countries to sign preferential trade agreements as an important exception to the principle of nondiscrimination. This has generated a debate on whether preferential trade agreements are 'building blocs'or 'stumbling blocs'on the way to multilateral free trade. See Panagariya (2000) tari¤s now generate revenue which is distributed in a lump-sum fashion to consumers. Third, production and trading technologies are now asymmetric in the sense that marginal costs c and …xed costs f are allowed to vary across countries and transport costs are allowed to vary across exporter-importer pairs. And …nally, there are now aggregate trade imbalances 2 7 Notice that the principle of nondiscrimination plays a di¤erent role in Bagwell and Staiger (1999) . There, it does not neutralize the multilateral terms-of-trade e¤ect by multilateralizing trade negotiations but instead by equalizing all bilateral terms-of-trade. In fact, multilateralizing trade negotiations would not be su¢ cient to neutralize the multilateral terms-of-trade e¤ect because the multilateral terms-of-trade are a trade-weighted average of the bilateral terms-of-trade and thus depend on trade shares unless the bilateral terms-of-trade are equalized. One implication of this di¤erence is that the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination neutralize all third party externalities without requiring any third party response in Bagwell and Staiger (1999) . 2 8 Notice that reciprocal trade liberalization no longer necessarily leads to e¢ cient tari¤s if the principle of nondiscrimination is imposed. This is because reciprocity and nondiscrimination can only be satis…ed if all tari¤s are lowered simultaneously, as can be easily established by di¤erentiating the three-country versions of the manufacturing market clearing conditions. But this is impossible if at least one of the tari¤s is equal to zero which is not su¢ cient for e¢ ciency, as can be seen from the three-country version of lemma 2. Recall, however, that the requirement to liberalize reciprocally is not binding in a legal sense so that this feature of the principle of nondiscrimination should not be overemphasized.
captured by an exogenous trade surplus parameter T B j . Everything else is just as in the basic model.
For given tari¤s, the model's solution is now determined by the following equations which represent manufacturing market clearing conditions, manufacturing price index de…nitions, and consumer expenditure conditions, respectively
The key di¤erence compared to the basic model is that consumer expenditure now consists of labor income minus the aggregate trade surplus plus tari¤ revenue necessitating the introduction of the consumer expenditure variable X j and the consumer expenditure condition (14) . 29 Denoting the counterfactual value of t ij by t 0 ij and counterfactual changes in ij by b ij 0 ij ij et cetera, it is easy to verify using the technique of Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007) that equations (12) - (14) can be rewritten in changes as
where ij , ij , j , and ij are simple functions of , tari¤s, and trade ‡ows which can be found in the appendix. Given estimates of and as well as data on tari¤s and trade ‡ows only, equations (15) - (17) can be used to compute the counterfactual changes in manufacturing price indices b G j , numbers of manufacturing …rms b n i , and consumer expenditures b X j induced by counterfactual tari¤s t 0 ij . Counterfactual changes in welfare can then be calculated from Tables 1 and 2 .
Before implementing the full seven-trade-bloc-case, it is instructive to brie ‡y turn to a simple two-trade-bloc example to illustrate the implications of tari¤ revenue and to motivate the algorithm used for computing Nash tari¤s. I generate such an example by keeping the United States only and aggregating all other countries into the Rest of the World. Figure   1 shows how the United States' welfare varies in the United States' tari¤ and reveals that there is now an interior optimal tari¤. The reason is that tari¤ revenue is hump-shaped in the tari¤ and the welfare loss due to a reduction in tari¤ revenue dominates the welfare gain due to additional production relocations at some point. Figure 2 plots the optimal tari¤ of the United States against the tari¤ of the Rest of the World and vice versa and suggests that Nash tari¤s can be computed using a simple iterative algorithm. In particular, the Nash equilibrium can be found by …rst computing the United States'optimal tari¤ given a guess of the Rest of the World's optimal tari¤, then computing the Rest of the World's optimal tari¤ given the United States'optimal tari¤, and so on, as this procedure quickly converges to the point at which both reaction functions cross. Both …gures take all factual tari¤s to be zero for simplicity and focus on the case = 9:28 only but look similar under alternative assumptions. Tables 3 and 4 Table 5 presents the counterfactual welfare losses from moving to the predicted Nash tari¤s. They range between 0 percent and -0.4 percent in the case of = 9:28 and between 0 percent and -1.2 percent in the case of = 4:60. All countries are therefore predicted to be weakly worse o¤ in the case of a tari¤ war.
Conclusion
In this paper, I developed and quanti…ed a 'new trade'theory of GATT/WTO negotiations.
My main result was that in a 'new trade'environment, GATT/WTO negotiations governed by the principles of reciprocity and nondiscrimination no longer necessarily have to be interpreted as helping countries internalize a terms-of-trade externality but can instead also be interpreted as helping countries internalize a production relocation externality.
This 'new trade'theory builds on a rationale for unilateral protection which can be linked directly to trade policy debates. In the model, the higher the import tari¤, the larger is the number of domestic manufacturing …rms; the larger the number of domestic manufacturing …rms, the lower is the domestic price index; and the lower the domestic price index, the higher is domestic welfare. Therefore, while trade policymakers are assumed to maximize domestic 
Solution for given trade policy
For given tari¤s, the model's solution is determined by the manufacturing market clearing
where q f ( 1) c and p c 1 as in the two-country case but the ideal manufacturing price indices are now given by G 1
, and G 3 n 1 (p 13 )
. Equations (18) - (18) can be solved immediately for the equilibrium manufacturing price indices 3 5 Notice that this restriction gets stronger the more countries are featured in the analysis. It should, however, not be taken literally empirically since wage adjustments are ruled out in order to cleanly isolate production relocation e¤ects. If positive pro…ts could also be competed away by wage adjustments instead of entry, a milder parameter restriction would be su¢ cient to guarantee diversi…ed manufacturing production.
It is easy to verify that 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; and > 0 given the assumed parameter restrictions. If the de…nitions of manufacturing price indices are substituted, they can also be solved for the equilibrium numbers of manufacturing …rms
As in the two-country case, the world number of manufacturing …rms is constant, tari¤s a¤ect welfare only through the manufacturing price indices, and there can be no role for terms-of-trade e¤ects.
Three-country version of lemma 1
Suppose that governments choose tari¤ s simultaneously in an attempt to maximize their citizens welfare. Then the unique Nash equilibrium is (t 21 ; t 31 ; t 12 ; t 13 ) = t; t; t; t :
Proof. Follows immediately from equations (21) -(23). better o¤ without making at least one of the other countries worse o¤. Therefore, they are also indeed Pareto e¢ cient.
Three-country version of lemma 2

Three-country version of proposition 1
Proof. Follows immediately from the three-country versions of lemmas 1 and 2
Proof of lemma 4
Proof. The statement that tari¤ changes leave the number of …rms unchanged in all countries if and only if they are multilaterally reciprocal follows immediately from equation (11) (19)).
Proof of proposition 3
Proof. Follows immediately from lemma 4 and the de…nitions of manufacturing price indices.
Quantitative application
The coe¢ cients in equations (12) - (14) are de…ned as ij
, and ij
, where T ij denotes the total value of trade ‡owing from country i to country j evaluated at world prices, S i P J j=1 T ij denotes the total value of manufacturing sales of …rms from country i evaluated at world prices, X j 1 P J i=1 ij T ij denotes the total expenditure of consumers in country j, and R j P J i=1 t ij T ij denotes the tari¤ revenue of country j.
E¤ects of t ! 1
If t ! 1, the two-country version of lemma 1, the three-country version of lemma 1, lemma 4, and proposition 3 would have to be modi…ed as follows:
E¤ect on the two-country version of lemma 1: If t ! 1, t; t would no longer be the unique Nash equilibrium but instead the unique trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium. In particular, < 0 as soon as
E¤ect on the two-country version of lemma 1: This is analogous to the e¤ect on the two-country version of lemma 1. If t ! 1, t; t; t; t would no longer be the unique Nash equilibrium but instead the unique trembling-hand perfect Nash equilibrium since all other Nash equilibria would not be robust to small perturbations in the governments'strategies. 
